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Abstract. For a non-cooperative differential game, the value functions of the various players
satisfy a system of Hamilton-Jacobi equations. In the present paper, we consider a class of infinite-
horizon games with nonlinear costs exponentially discounted in time. By the analysis of the value
functions, we establish the existence of Nash equilibrium solutions in feedback form and provide
results and counterexamples on their uniqueness and stability.
1 - Introduction
Problems of optimal control, or zero-sum differential games, have been the topic of an extensive
literature. In both cases, an effective tool for the analysis of optimal solutions is provided by
the value function, which satisfies a scalar Hamilton-Jacobi equation. Typically, this first order
P.D.E. is highly non-linear and solutions may not be smooth. However, thanks to a very effective
comparison principle, the existence and stability of solutions can be achieved in great generality
by the theory of viscosity solutions, see [BC] and references therein.
In comparison, much less is known about non-cooperative differential games. In a Nash equi-
librium solution, the value functions for the various players now satisfy not a scalar but a system
of Hamilton-Jacobi equations [F]. For this type of nonlinear systems, no general theorems on the
existence or uniqueness of solutions are yet known. A major portion of the literature is concerned
with games having linear dynamics and quadratic costs, see [WSE],[EW],[AFJ] and [PMC]. In
this case, solutions are sought among quadratic functions. This approach effectively reduces the
P.D.E. problem to a finite dimensional O.D.E.. However, it does not provide insight on the stability
(or instability) of the solutions w.r.t. small non-linear perturbations.
In [BS1] the first author studied a class of non-cooperative games with general terminal pay-
off, in one space dimension. Relying on recent advances in the theory of hyperbolic systems of
conservation laws, some results on the existence and stability of Nash equilibrium solutions could
be obtained. On the other hand, for games in several space dimensions and also in various one-
dimensional cases, the analysis in [BS2] shows that the corresponding H-J system is not hyperbolic,
hence ill posed.
In the present paper we begin exploring a class of non-cooperative differential games in infinite
time horizon, with exponentially discounted costs. In one space dimension, the corresponding value
functions satisfy a time-independent system of implicit O.D.E’s. Global solutions are sought within
a class of absolutely continuous functions, imposing certain growth conditions as |x| → ∞, and
suitable admissibility conditions at points where the gradient ux has a jump.
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The dynamics of our system is very elementary, and the cost functions that we consider are
small perturbations of linear ones. However, already in this simple setting we find cases where
the problem has unique solution, and cases where infinitely many solutions exist. This provides
a glimpse of the extreme complexity of the problem, for general non-cooperative N -player games
with non-linear cost functions.
The plan of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we describe the differential game, introducing
the basic notations and definitions. In Section 3 we prove that, from an admissible solution to the
O.D.E. for the value function, one can always recover a Nash equilibrium solution to the differential
game. The relevance of our admissibility conditions is then highlighted by two examples.
The existence and uniqueness of global admissible solutions to the H-J system for the value
functions is then studied in Sections 3 and 4. We first consider the cooperative case, where both
players wish to move the state of the system in the same direction. In the case with terminal
payoff, this situation was leading to a well-posed hyperbolic Cauchy problem [BS1]. As expected,
in the infinite-horizon case we still obtain an existence and uniqueness result. Subsequently, we
consider the case of conflicting interests, where the players wish to steer the system in opposite
directions. In the case with terminal payoff, this situation leads to an ill-posed Cauchy problem,
as shown in [BS2]. Somewhat surprisingly, we find that the corresponding infinite-horizon case can
have unique or multiple solutions, depending on the values of certain parameters.
2 - Basic definitions
Consider an m-persons non-cooperative differential game, with dynamics
x˙ =
m∑
i=1
fi(x, αi), αi(t) ∈ Ai , x ∈ IRn. (2.1)
Here t 7→ αi(t) is the control chosen by the i-th player, within a set of admissible control values
Ai ⊆ IRk. We will study the discounted, infinite horizon problem, where the game takes
place on an infinite interval of time [0, ∞[ , and each player has only a running cost, discounted
exponentially in time. More precisely, for a given initial data
x(0) = y ∈ IRn , (2.2)
the goal of the i-th player is to minimize the functional
Ji(α)
.
=
∫ ∞
0
e−t ψi
(
x(t), αi(t)
)
dt , (2.3)
where t 7→ x(t) is the trajectory of (2.1). By definition, an m-tuple of feedback strategies αi =
α∗i (x), i = 1, . . . ,m, represents a Nash non-cooperative equilibrium solution for the differential
game (2.1)-(2.2) if the following holds. For every i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, the feedback control αi = α∗(x)
provides a solution to the the optimal control problem for the i-th player,
min
α(·)
Ji(α) , (2.4)
where the dynamics of the system is
x˙ = fi(x, αi) +
∑
j 6=i
fj(x, α
∗
j (x)), αi(t) ∈ Ai . (2.5)
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More precisely, we require that, for every initial data y ∈ IR, the Cauchy problem
x˙ =
m∑
j=1
fj
(
x, α∗j (x)
)
, x(0) = y , (2.6)
should have at least one Caratheodory solution t 7→ x(t), defined for all t ∈ [0,∞[ . Moreover, for
every such solution and each i = 1, . . . ,m, the cost to the i-th player should provide the minimum
for the optimal control problem (2.4)-(2.5). We recall that a Caratheodory solution is an absolutely
continuous function t 7→ x(t) which satisfies the differential equation in (2.6) at almost every t > 0.
Nash equilibrium solutions in feedback form can be obtained by studying a related system of
P.D.E’s. Assume that a value function u(y) = (u1, . . . , un)(y) exists, so that ui(y) represents the
cost for the i-th player when the initial state of the system is x(0) = y and the strategies α∗1, . . . , α
∗
m
are implemented. By the theory of optimal control, see for example [BC], on regions where u is
smooth, each component ui should provide a solution to the corresponding scalar Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equation. The vector function u thus satisfies the stationary system of equations
ui(x) = Hi(x, ∇u1, . . . ,∇um), (2.7)
where the Hamiltonian functions Hi are defined as follows. For each pj ∈ IRn, assume that there
exists an optimal control value α∗j (x, pj) such that
pj · fj
(
x, α∗j (x, pj)
)
+ ψj
(
x, α∗j (x, pj)
)
= min
a∈Aj
{
pj · fj(x, a) + ψj(x, a)
}
. (2.8)
Then
Hi(x, p1, . . . , pm)
.
= pi ·
m∑
j=1
fj
(
x, α∗j (x, pj)
)
+ ψi
(
x, α∗i (x, pi)
)
. (2.9)
A rich literature is currently available on optimal control problems and on viscosity solutions
to the corresponding scalar H-J equations. However, little is yet known about non-cooperative
differential games, apart from the linear-quadratic case. In this paper we begin a study of this
class of differential games, with two players in one space dimension. Our main interest is in the
existence, uniqueness and stability of Nash equilibrium solutions in feedback form.
When x is a scalar variable, (2.7) reduces to a system of implicit O.D.E’s:
ui = Hi(x, u
′
1, . . . , u
′
m) . (2.10)
In general, this system will have infinitely many solutions. To single out a (hopefully unique)
admissible solution, corresponding to a Nash equilibrium for the differential game, additional re-
quirements must be imposed. These are of two types:
(i) Asymptotic growth conditions as |x| → ∞.
(ii) Jump conditions, at points where the derivative u′ is discontinuous.
To fix the ideas, consider a game with the simple dynamics
x˙(t) = α1(t) + · · · + αm(t) , (2.11)
and with cost functionals of the form
Ji(α)
.
=
∫ ∞
0
e−t
[
hi
(
x(t)) + ki
(
x(t)
) α2i (t)
2
]
dt . (2.12)
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We shall assume that the functions hi, ki are smooth and satisfy
∣∣h′i(x)∣∣ ≤ C , 1C ≤ ki(x) ≤ C , (2.13)
for some constant C > 0. Notice that in this case (2.8) yields α∗i = −pi/ki, hence (2.10) becomes
ui =

 u′i
2ki(x)
−
m∑
j=1
u′j
kj(x)

 u′i + hi(x) . (2.14)
For a solution to the system of H-J equations (2.14), a natural set of admissibility conditions is
formulated below.
Definition 1. A function u : IR 7→ IRm is called an admissible solution to the implicit system of
O.D.E’s (2.14) if the following holds.
(A1) u is absolutely continuous. Its derivative u′ satisfies the equations (2.14) at a.e. point x ∈ IR.
(A2) u has sublinear growth at infinity. Namely, there exists a constant C such that, for all x ∈ IR,∣∣u(x)∣∣ ≤ C (1 + |x|) . (2.15)
(A3) At every point y ∈ IR, the derivative u′ admits right and left limits u′(y+), u′(y−). At points
where u′ is discontinuous, these limits satisfy the admissibility conditions
m∑
i=1
u′i(y+)
ki(y)
≤ 0 ≤
m∑
i=1
u′i(y−)
ki(y)
. (2.16)
Because of the assumption (2.13), the cost functions hi are globally Lipschitz continuous.
It is thus natural to require that the value functions ui be absolutely continuous, with sub-linear
growth as x→ ±∞. Call p±i .= u′i(y±). By the equations (2.14) and the continuity of the functions
ui, hi, ki, one obtains the identities
(p+i )
2
2ki(y)
+
∑
j 6=i
p+i p
+
j
kj(y)
=
(p−i )
2
2ki(y)
+
∑
j 6=i
p−i p
−
j
kj(y)
i = 1, . . . ,m . (2.17)
Recalling that the feedback controls are α∗i = −u′i/ki, the condition (2.16) now becomes clear: it
states that x˙(y−) ≤ 0 ≤ x˙(y+), i.e., trajectories should move away from a point of discontinuity.
Notice that all of the above conditions are satisfied at a point y such that
∑
j
u′j(y+)
kj(y)
≤ 0 , u′i(y+) + u′i(y−) = 0 i = 1, . . . ,m . (2.18)
By (A1), the derivatives pi = u
′
i are defined at a. e. point x ∈ IR. The optimal feedback
controls α∗i = −pi/ki are thus defined almost everywhere. We can use the further assumption (A3)
and extend these functions to the whole real line by taking limits from the right:
α∗(x) .= −u
′
i(x+)
ki(x)
. (2.19)
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In this way, all feedback control functions will be right-continuous.
The system of implicit differential equations (2.14) is highly nonlinear and difficult to study
in full generality. In this paper we initiate the analysis by looking at some significant cases. Our
main results can be roughly summarized as follows:
(i) If u = (u1, . . . um) provides an admissible solution to the system of Hamilton-Jacobi equa-
tions (2.14), then the feedback strategies (2.19) provide a Nash equilibrium solution to the
differential game (2.11)-(2.12).
(ii) For games with two players, if the cost functions h1, h2 are both monotone increasing (or both
monotone decreasing), then (2.14) has a unique admissible solution.
(iii) Still in the case of two players, one can give examples where the derivatives of the cost functions
satisfy h′i + h
′
2 = 0 and infinitely many admissible solutions of (2.14) are found. On the other
hand, if the sum h′1 + h
′
2 remains bounded away from zero, then under suitable assumptions
the system (2.14) has a unique admissible solution.
3 - Solutions of the differential game
In this section we prove that admissible solutions to the H-J equations yield a solution to the
differential game. Moreover, we give a couple of examples showing the relevance of the assumptions
(A2) and (A3).
Theorem 1. Consider the differential game (2.11)-(2.12), with the assumptions (2.13). Let
u : IR 7→ IRm be an admissible solution to the systems of H-J equations (2.14), so that the conditions
(A1)–(A3) hold. Then the controls (2.19) provide a Nash equilibrium solution in feedback form.
Proof. The theorem will be proved in several steps.
1. First of all, setting
g(x)
.
=
∑
i
α∗i (x) = −
∑
i
u′i(x)
ki(x)
, (3.1)
we need to prove that the Cauchy problem
x˙(t) = g
(
x(t)
)
, x(0) = y , (3.2)
has a globally defined solution, for every initial data y ∈ IR. This is not entirely obvious, because
the function g may be discontinuous. We start by proving the local existence of solutions.
CASE 1: g(y) = 0. In this trivial case x(t) ≡ y is the required solution.
CASE 2: g(y) > 0. By right continuity, we then have g(x) > 0 for x ∈ [y, y + δ], for some δ > 0.
This implies the existence of a (unique) strictly increasing solution x : [0, ε] 7→ IR, for some ε > 0.
CASE 3: g(y) < 0. By the admissibility conditions (2.16), this implies that g is continuous and
negative in a neighborhood of y. Therefore the Cauchy problem (3.2) admits a (unique) strictly
decreasing solution x : [0, ε] 7→ IR, for some ε > 0.
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2. Next, we prove that the local solution can be extended to all positive times. For this purpose,
we need to rule out the possibility that
∣∣x(t)∣∣ → ∞ in finite time. We first observe that each
trajectory is monotone, i.e., either non-increasing, or non-decreasing, for t ∈ [0,∞[ . To fix the
ideas, let t 7→ x(t) be strictly increasing, with x(t) → ∞ as t → T− . A contradiction is now
obtained as follows. For each τ > 0, using (2.14) we compute
∑
i
ui
(
x(τ)
)−∑
i
ui
(
x(0)
)
=
∫ τ
0
{
d
dt
∑
i
ui
(
x(t)
)}
dt
=
∫ τ
0
−


∑
i
u′i
(
x(t)
) ·∑
j
u′j
(
x(t)
)
kj
(
x(t)
)

 dt
=
∫ τ
0
∑
i
{
ui
(
x(t)
)−
∣∣u′i(x(t))∣∣2
2ki(x(t))
− hi
(
x(t)
)}
dt
(3.3)
By assumptions, the functions ui and hi have sub-linear growth. Moreover, each ki is uniformly
positive and bounded above. Using the elementary inequality
∣∣x(τ)− x(0)∣∣ ≤ ∫ τ
0
1 · ∣∣x˙(t)∣∣ dt ≤ (∫ τ
0
1 dt
)1/2
·
(∫ τ
0
∣∣x˙(t)∣∣2 dt)1/2 ,
from (3.3) we thus obtain∣∣x(τ)− x(0)∣∣2
τ
≤
∫ τ
0
∣∣x˙(t)∣∣2 dt ≤ 4C ∫ τ
0
∑
i
∣∣u′i(x(t))∣∣2
2ki(x(t))
dt
≤ 4C
{ ∣∣∣∣∣
∑
i
ui
(
x(τ)
)−∑
i
ui
(
x(0)
)∣∣∣∣∣+
∫ τ
0
∑
i
∣∣ui(x(t))∣∣dt+
∫ τ
0
∑
i
∣∣hi(x(t))∣∣dt
}
≤ C0 (1 + τ)
{
2 +
∣∣x(τ)∣∣+ ∣∣x(0)∣∣} ,
for some constant C0. Therefore, either
∣∣x(τ)∣∣ ≤ 2 + 3∣∣x(0)∣∣, or else∣∣x(τ)∣∣ ≤ ∣∣x(0)∣∣+ 2τ · C0 (1 + τ) . (3.4)
In any case, blow-up cannot occur at any finite time T .
3. To complete the proof, for each fixed i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, we have to show that the feedback α∗i in
(2.19) provides solution to the optimal control problem for the i-th player:
min
αi(·)
∫ ∞
0
e−t
[
hi
(
x(t)) + ki
(
x(t)
) α2i (t)
2
]
dt , (3.5)
where the system has dynamics
x˙ = αi +
∑
j 6=i
α∗j (x) . (3.6)
Given an initial state x(0) = y, by the assumptions on u it follows that the feedback strategy
αi = α
∗
i (x) achieves a total cost given by ui(y). Now consider any absolutely continuous trajectory
t 7→ x(t), with x(0) = y. Of course, this corresponds to the control
αi(t)
.
= x˙(t)−
∑
j 6=i
α∗j (x) (3.7)
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implemented by the i-th player. We claim that the corresponding cost satisfies
∫ ∞
0
e−t
[
hi
(
x(t)
)
+
ki
2
(
x˙(t)−
∑
j 6=i
α∗j
(
x(t)
))2]
dt ≥ ui(y) . (3.8)
To prove (3.8), we first observe that (3.4) implies
lim
t→∞
e−tui
(
x(t)
)
= 0 i = 1, . . . , n .
Hence
ui(y) = ui
(
x(0)
)
= −
∫ ∞
0
d
dt
[
e−tui
(
x(t)
)]
dt .
The inequality (3.8) can now be established by checking that
e−t
[
hi
(
x(t)
)
+
ki
2
(
x˙(t)−
∑
j 6=i
α∗j
(
x(t)
))2] ≥ e−tui(x(t))− e−tu′i(x(t)) · x˙(t) . (3.9)
Equivalently, letting αi be as in (3.7),
ui ≤

αi −∑
j 6=i
u′j
kj

u′i + ki2 α2i + hi .
This is clearly true because, by (2.8),
ui(x) = min
a

ki2 a2 + au′i −
∑
j 6=i
u′ju
′
i
kj
+ hi(x)

 .
We now give two examples showing that, if the growth assumptions (2.15) or if the jump
conditions (2.16) are not satisfied, then the feedbacks (2.19) may not provide a Nash equilibrium
solution. This situation is well known already in the context of control problem.
Examples. Consider the game for two players, with dynamics
x˙ = α1 + α2 , (3.10)
and cost functionals
Ji =
∫ ∞
0
e−t · α
2
i (t)
2
dt .
In this case, if u′i = pi, the optimal control for the i-th player is
α∗i (pi) = arg min
ω
{
pi ω +
ω2
2
}
= −pi .
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The system of H-J takes the simple form


u1 = −
(
u′1
2
+ u′2
)
u′1 ,
u2 = −
(
u′1 +
u′2
2
)
u′2 .
(3.11)
The obvious admissible solution is u1 ≡ u2 ≡ 0, corresponding to identically zero controls, and
zero cost. We now observe that the functions
u1(x) =
{
0 if |x| ≥ 1 ,
− 1
2
(
1− |x|)2 if |x| < 1 , u2(x) = 0 ,
provide a solution to (3.11), which is not admissible because the conditions (2.16) fail at x = 0.
Next, the functions
u1(x) = −1
2
x2, u2(x) = 0 ,
provide yet another another solution, which does not satisfy the growth conditions (2.15).
In the above two cases, the corresponding feedbacks α∗i (x) = −u′i(x) do not yield a solution
to the differential game.
4 - Cooperative situations
We consider here a game for two players, with dynamics
x˙ = α1 + α2 , (4.1)
and cost functionals of the form
Ji(α)
.
=
∫ ∞
0
e−t
[
hi
(
x(t)) +
α2i (t)
2
]
dt . (4.2)
Notice that, for any positive constants k1, k2, λ, the more general case
Ji(α)
.
=
∫ ∞
0
e−λt
[
h˜i
(
x(t)) +
α2i (t)
2ki
]
dt
can be reduced to (4.2) by a linear change of variables.
The system of H-J equations for the value functions now takes the form
{
u1(x) = h1(x)− u′1u′2 − (u′1)2/2 ,
u2(x) = h2(x)− u′1u′2 − (u′2)2/2 ,
(4.3)
and the optimal feedback controls are given by
α∗i (x) = −u′i(x) . (4.4)
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Differentiating (4.3) and setting pi = u
′
i one obtains the system{
h′1 − p1 = (p1 + p2)p′1 + p1p′2 ,
h′2 − p2 = p2p′1 + (p1 + p2)p′2 .
(4.5)
Set
Λ(p)
.
=
(
p1 + p2 p1
p2 p1 + p2
)
, ∆(p)
.
= det Λ(p) .
From (4.5) we deduce {
p′1 = ∆(p)
−1[− p21 + (h′1 − h′2)p1 + h′1p2] ,
p′2 = ∆(p)
−1[− p22 + (h′2 − h′1)p2 + h′2p1] . (4.6)
Notice that
1
2
(p21 + p
2
2) ≤ ∆(p) ≤ 2(p21 + p22) . (4.7)
In particular, ∆(p) > 0 for all p = (p1, p2) 6= (0, 0). Up to a rescaling of the independent variable,
we can thus study the equivalent system
{
p′1 = (h
′
1 − h′2)p1 + h′1p2 − p21 ,
p′2 = (h
′
2 − h′1)p2 + h′2p1 − p22 .
(4.8)
For piecewise smooth solutions, jumps are only allowed from any point (p−1 , p
−
2 ) with
p−1 + p
−
2 ≥ 0 (4.9)
to the symmetric point
(p+1 , p
+
2 ) = (−p−1 , −p−2 ) . (4.10)
Theorem 2. Let the cost functions h1, h2 be smooth, and assume that their derivatives satisfy
1
C
≤ h′i(x) ≤ C (4.11)
for some constant C > 1 and all x ∈ IR. Then the system (4.3) has an admissible solution. The
corresponding functions α∗i in (4.4) provide a Nash equilibrium solution to the non-cooperative
game.
Proof. Write the O.D.E. (4.6) in the more compact form
dp
dx
= f(p) . (4.12)
To show the existence of at least one admissible solution of (4.3), for every ν ≥ 1 let p(ν) : [−ν,∞[→
IR2 be the solution of the Cauchy problem
dp(ν)
dx
= f
(
p(ν)
)
, p(ν)(−ν) = (1, 1). (4.13)
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It is easy to check that the polygon
Γ
.
=
{
(p1, p2) ; p1, p2 ∈ [0, 2C] , p1 + p2 ≥ 1/2C
}
is positively invariant for the flow of (4.6). Hence p(ν)(x) ∈ Γ for all ν ≥ 1 and x ≥ −ν. We can
extend each function p(ν) to the whole real line by setting
p(ν)(x) = (1, 1) for x < −ν .
By uniform boundedness and equicontinuity, the sequence p(ν) admits a subsequence converging
to a uniformly continuous function p : IR 7→ Γ. Clearly this limit function provides a continuous,
globally bounded solution of (4.6). We then define the controls α∗i (x)
.
= −pi(x) and the cost
functions
ui(y)
.
=
∫ ∞
0
e−t
[
hi
(
x(t, y)) +
1
2
(
α∗i
(
x(t, y)
))2]
dt , (4.14)
where t 7→ x(t, y) denotes the solution to the Cauchy problem
x˙ = α∗1(x) + α
∗
2(x) , x(0) = y . (4.15)
This function provides a globally Lipschitz, smooth solution of the system (4.3).
In the case where the oscillation of the derivatives h′i is sufficiently small, we can also prove
the uniqueness of the Nash feedback solution.
Theorem 3. Let the cost functions be smooth, with derivatives satisfying (4.11), for some constant
C. Assume that the oscillation of their derivatives satisfies
sup
x,y∈IR
∣∣h′i(x)− h′i(y)∣∣ ≤ δ i = 1, 2 (4.16)
for some δ > 0 sufficiently small (depending only on C). Then the admissible solution of the system
(4.3) is unique.
Before giving details of the proof, we sketch the main ideas. In the case of linear cost functions,
where hi(x) = κi x, h
′
i ≡ κi, the phase portrait of the planar O.D.E. (4.8) is depicted in Figure 1.
We observe that
- Unbounded trajectories of (4.8), with
∣∣p(s)∣∣→∞ as s→ s¯, correspond to solutions p = p(x)
of (4.6) with
∣∣p(x)∣∣→∞, ∣∣p′(x)∣∣→∞ as x→ ±∞. Indeed, because of the rescaling (4.7), as the
parameter s approaches s finite limit s¯, we have |x| → ∞. This yields a solution u(x) = ∫ x∗ p(x) dx
which does not satisfy the growth restrictions (2.15).
- The heteroclinic orbit, joining the origin with the point (κ1, κ2), corresponds to a trajectory of
(4.16) defined on a half line, say [x¯,∞[ . To prolong this solution for x < x¯ one needs a trajectory of
(4.16) which approaches the origin as s→∞. But the two available solutions are both unbounded,
hence not acceptable.
- Finally, one must examine solutions whose gradient has one or more jumps, from a point
P = (p1, p2) with p1 + p2 ≥ 0 to its symmetric point −P = (−p1, −p2). However, a direct
inspection shows that, even allowing these jumps, one still cannot construct any new globally
bounded trajectory.
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Figure 1
In the end, in linear case, one finds that the only admissible solution is (p1, p2) ≡ (κ1, κ2). A
perturbative argument shows that this conclusion remains valid if a small C1 perturbation is added
to the cost functions.
Proof of Theorem 3. First Step. We begin with the case h′i(x) ≡ κi and assume, without any
loss of generality, that κ1 ≤ κ2.
Let p˜ be a smooth solution of (4.8), as shown in Figure 1.
We observe that the following facts hold (see Figure 2):
1. Both sets A = {(p1, p2) 6= (0, 0) : p1 ≤ 0 , p2 ≤ 0} and {(p1, p2) 6= (0, 0) : p1 ≥ 0 , p2 ≥ 0}
are positively invariant for the flow of (4.8) and both B = {(p1, p2) : p1 > 0 , p2 < 0} and
C = {(p1, p2) : p1 < 0 , p2 > 0} are negatively invariant.
2. If p˜(so) ∈ A = {(p1, p2) 6= (0, 0) : p1 ≤ 0 , p2 ≤ 0} for some so, then |p˜| → +∞ as s → +∞.
Indeed, since
d
ds
(p˜1 + p˜2) = −p˜21 − p˜22 + κ1p˜1 + κ2p˜2 ≤ −
1
2
(p˜1 + p˜2)
2 < 0 ,
we can assume there exist s¯ ≥ so and ε > 0 such that p˜1(s¯) + p˜2(s¯) < −ε. Moreover, the following
11
holds for any σ > s¯:
d
ds
(p˜1 + p˜2)(σ) ≤ −1
2
(p˜1(σ) + p˜2(σ))
2 < −1
2
(p˜1(s¯) + p˜2(s¯))(p˜1(σ) + p˜2(σ)) <
ε
2
(p˜1(σ) + p˜2(σ)) .
Hence, an integration yields (p˜1 + p˜2)(s) ≤ −ηe ε2 s for s > s¯ (and η > 0) and (p˜1 + p˜2) → −∞ as
s→ +∞.
3. If p˜(so) ∈ B = {(p1, p2) : p1 > 0 , p2 < 0} for some so, then |p˜| → +∞ as s → −∞. Indeed,
let ε > 0 such that p˜1(so) > ε. Since
d
ds
p˜1 = −p˜21 + (κ1 − κ2)p˜1 + κ1p˜2 ≤ −(p˜1 + κ2 − κ1)p˜1 < 0 ,
it is sufficient to observe that, for σ < so,
d
ds
p˜1(σ) < −(p˜1(so) + κ2 − κ1)p˜1(σ) ≤ −(ε+ κ2 − κ1)p˜1(σ) .
Hence, an integration yields p˜1(s) ≥ ηe−(ε+κ2−κ1)s for s < so (and η > 0) and p˜1 → +∞ as
s→ −∞.
C
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4. If p˜(so) ∈ C1 = {(p1, p2) : p1 < 0 , p2 > κ2 − κ1} for some so, then |p˜| → +∞ as s → −∞.
Here the argument is exactly the same as in the previous case with p˜2 in place of p˜1.
5. If p˜(so) ∈ C2 = {(p1, p2) : p1 < 0 , 0 < p2 ≤ κ2− κ1} then there exists s¯ < so such that p˜(s¯) is
in C1 as in case 4. above. Indeed there could be only two situations.
If −p˜1(so)2+(κ1−κ2)p˜1(so)+κ1p˜2(so) ≥ 0, then, by negative invariance, p˜ could only have reached
this region from C1, hence there exists s¯ ≤ so such that p˜(s¯) is as in case 4 above. Otherwise, using
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again negative invariance and the fact that there are no equilibria in C2, either there exists s¯ ≤ so
such that p˜(s¯) is in case 4 above, or there exists s1 < so such that −p˜1(s1)2 + (κ1 − κ2)p˜1(s1) +
κ1p˜2(s1) ≥ 0 and then, by the previous case, the existence of such a s¯ < s1 < so follows.
6. If p˜(so) ∈ D = {(p1, p2) : p1 ≥ 0 , p2 ≥ 0 , p1 + p2 ≥ 2κ2} for some so, then |p˜| → +∞ as
s→ −∞. Indeed, since
d
ds
(p˜1 + p˜2) = −p˜21 − p˜22 + κ1p˜1 + κ2p˜2 ≤ −
1
2
(p˜1 + p˜2 − 2κ2)(p˜1 + p˜2) ≤ 0
(and the inequality is actually strict when p1 + p2 = 2κ2), we can assume that there exist s¯ ≤ so
and ε > 0 such that p˜1(s¯) + p˜2(s¯) > 2κ2 + ε. Moreover, the following holds for any σ < s¯:
d
ds
(p˜1 + p˜2)(σ) < −1
2
(p˜1(s¯) + p˜2(s¯)− 2κ2)(p˜1(σ) + p˜2(σ)) < −ε
2
(p˜1(σ) + p˜2(σ)) .
Hence by integrating we find (p˜1+ p˜2)(s) ≥ ηe− ε2 s for s < s¯ and η > 0. Therefore (p˜1+ p˜2)→ +∞
as s→ −∞.
7. If p˜(so) ∈ E = {(p1, p2) 6= (0, 0) : p1 ≥ 0 , p2 ≥ 0 , p1 + p2 ≤ 2κ1} for some so, then from
d
ds
(p˜1 + p˜2) = −p˜21 − p˜22 + κ1p˜1 + κ2p˜2 ≥ −
1
2
(p˜1 + p˜2 − 2κ1)(p˜1 + p˜2) ≥ 0 ,
it follows, as above, that either p˜ → 0 for s → −∞ or there exists s¯ ≤ so such that p˜(s¯) satisfies
one of the previous cases 3-4-5.
8. If p˜(so) ∈ F = {(p1, p2) : p1 ≥ 0 , p2 ≥ 0 , 2κ1 < p1 + p2 < 2κ2} for some so and p 6= p˜, then
there exists a small circle V (say with radius smaller than |p˜(so)− p(so)|) around the stable focus
p ≡ (κ1, κ2) such that p˜ /∈ V for s < so. But then, looking at the signs of the derivatives of p˜i, as
s → −∞ our solution p˜ must go away from the whole region F and there exists s¯ < so such that
p˜(s¯) is in one of the previous cases.
u
?
u
?
oxox
Figure 3a Figure 3b
9. We can now provide more accurate estimates on blow-up. Indeed by previous analysis, blow-up
of |p˜| can only occur when either p˜i → −∞ as s→ +∞ or p˜i → +∞ as s→ −∞, for some index
i ∈ {1, 2}. To fix the ideas, assume |p˜1| → ∞. Then for s sufficiently large
− p˜
2
1
2
+ (κ1 − κ2)p˜1 + κ1p˜2 < 0 .
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Integrating the inequality dds p˜1 < − p˜
2
1
2 , one can conclude that |p˜| → ∞ as s → so, for some finite
so in both cases. In particular for this so ∈ IR (and η > 0) p˜ satisfies |p˜(s)| ≥ η|s−so| .
In terms of the original variable x, one may guess that the corresponding function p˜ = p˜(x)
could be as in Figure 3a and that u may be continued beyond the point where p˜ blows-up (say
xo = x(so)). But this is not the case since such a trajectory yields a solution defined on the whole
real line. Indeed by (4.7) ∣∣∣∣dxds
∣∣∣∣ = ∆(p˜(s)) ≥ co(so − s)2 . (4.17)
for some co > 0, and therefore either x(s) → +∞ as s → so− or x(s) → −∞ as s → so+.
Therefore, the solution u˜(x), corresponding to p˜(x), violates the growth assumptions (2.15) and is
not admissible.
10. We remark that in case 7, the solution p˜ can tend to 0 as s→ −∞. But then for some co > 0
|p˜| ≤ p˜1 + p˜2 ≤ ecos .
Recalling (4.7) we obtain, in terms of the variable x,∣∣∣∣dxds
∣∣∣∣ = ∆(p˜(s)) = O(1) · e2cos , (4.18)
lim
s→−∞
x(s) = xo <∞ ,
for some xo ∈ IR. Therefore, to the entire trajectory s 7→ p˜(s), there corresponds only a portion of
the trajectory x 7→ p˜(x), namely for x > xo.
To prolong the solution u˜ for x < xo, we need to construct another trajectory s 7→ p(s) such
that lims→+∞ p(s) = 0. But this trajectory, by previous analysis, will be unbounded, hence the
corresponding u˜(x), will not be admissible.
11. Next, we consider the case where p˜(s) is a discontinuous solution with admissible jumps. In this
case, first of all we can say that p˜ has no more than 2 jumps. Indeed the set Ξ1 = {(p1, p2) : p2 <
0 , p1 + p2 ≤ 0} is positively invariant and Ξ2 = {(p1, p2) : p2 < 0 , p1 + p2 > 0} is negatively
invariant. Hence if a jump occurs at so, either p˜(so+) ∈ Ξ1 or p˜(so−) ∈ Ξ2. In the former case
p˜(s) has no jumps for s > so; in the latter case p˜ has no jumps for s < so. This means that there
could be at most two jumps when there exist s1 < s2 ≤ s3 such that
• a first jump occurs at s1 and p˜(s1−) ∈ Ξ2,
• p˜ crosses the line p1 + p2 = 0 at s2,
• a last jump occurs at s3 and p˜(s3+) ∈ Ξ1.
In any case, the corresponding solution u˜ does not satisfy (2.15) and is not admissible. Indeed, we
can have only three situations for a p˜ with an admissible jump at so:
(a) if p˜(so−) ∈ Ξ2, then |p˜| → ∞ as s→ −∞;
(b) if p˜(so+) ∈ Ξ1 and p˜1(so+) > 0, then either p˜(s) is continuous for s < so (and therefore
|p˜| → ∞ as s → −∞) or p˜ has another jump at s¯ such that p˜(s¯−) ∈ Ξ2 (and therefore again
|p˜| → ∞ as s→ −∞);
(c) if p˜(so+) ∈ Ξ1 and p˜1(so+) ≤ 0, then |p˜| → ∞ as s→ +∞.
Second Step. We now extend the proof, in the presence of a sufficiently small perturbation. By
(4.16), there exist constants κ1, κ2 > 0 such that∣∣h′1(x)− κ1∣∣ ≤ δ , ∣∣h′2(x)− κ2∣∣ ≤ δ for all x ∈ IR . (4.19)
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Let u(·) be the solution constructed in Theorem 2, and let u˜ be any other smooth solution of
(4.8). Call p = u′, p˜ = u˜′ the corresponding gradients, rescaled as before, and let V be a small open
bounded set containing the whole image of p and the point (κ1, κ2). Of course it is not restrictive
to consider V as circular, say with radius ρ > 0.
Now we split the proof in three cases.
CASE 1: p˜(s) ∈ V for every s. In this case we look at the difference w(s) = p˜(s) − p(s). We can
write a linear evolution equation for w:
dw
ds
= A(s)w(s) , (4.20)
where the matrix A is the “average” matrix
A(s) =
∫ 1
0
Df(θp(s) + (1− θ)p˜(s))dθ , (4.21)
and f is the vector field at (4.12).
Since p, p˜ ∈ V , the matrix A(s) is very close to the Jacobian matrix Df(κ1, κ2), therefore
d
ds
∣∣w(s)∣∣ ≤ −K ∣∣w(s)∣∣ , (4.22)
for some constant K > 0. Indeed Df(κ1, κ2) is negative definite and, provided δ (and then ρ) is
small enough, A(s) is negative definite too. Hence
2
∣∣w(s)∣∣ d
ds
∣∣w(s)∣∣ = d
ds
∣∣w(s)∣∣2 = 2 d
ds
w(s) · w(s) = 2A(s)w(s) · w(s) ≤ −2K∣∣w(s)∣∣2 .
Now integrating (4.22), we have for s < 0,
2ρ ≥ ∣∣w(s)∣∣ ≥ e−Ks∣∣w(0)∣∣
and, letting s→ −∞, find∣∣w(0)∣∣ ≤ lim
s→−∞
∣∣w(s)∣∣eKs ≤ lim
s→−∞
2ρeKs = 0 . (4.23)
This implies p(0) = p˜(0), hence p = p˜ by the uniqueness of the Cauchy problem.
CASE 2: p˜(so) /∈ V for some so and, in particular, p˜(so) in a small neighbourhoodW of the origin.
Consider the linearized system near (0, 0)(
p′1
p′2
)
= H ·
(
p1
p2
)
, H =
(
h′1 − h′2 h′1
h′2 h
′
2 − h′1
)
,
and notice that the origin is a saddle point for this system. Indeed H has eigenvalues λ1, λ2 such
that
0 <
√
3
4C2
≤ |λi| =
√
(h′1)2 + (h
′
2)
2 − h′1h′2 ≤
√
2C2 − 1
C2
, (4.24)
where C is the constant in (4.11). Moreover its eigenvectors v1, v2 form angles α1, α2 with the
positive direction of the p1-axis such that
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0 <
1
C
(√
d2 +
1
C2
− d
)
≤ |tanαi| =
∣∣∣∣λi + (h′2 − h′1)h′1
∣∣∣∣ ≤ C (√d2 + C2 + d) , (4.25)
where d = (C − 1C ) > 0 and C is again from (4.11).
Hence, exactly as one can do with saddle points in the autonomous case, we can prove that there
exist four sectors Si, i = 1, . . . , 4 (see Figure 4), where the following facts hold:
(a) If p˜(so) is in S1 or S3, then |p˜(s)| grows for s < so and the solution moves away from W ;
(b) Both boundaries of S2 and S4 allow orbits to only exit from those sectors for s < so;
(c) If p˜(so) /∈ Si for all i = 1, . . . , 4, then for s < so the angle between the vector (p˜1, p˜2) and the
p1-axis is strictly monotone, forcing the solution either to reach S1 or S3, or to move away from
W ;
(d) Finally, if p˜(so) is in S2 or S4, then for s < so the solution can tend to the origin. But, since
d
ds
(p˜1 + p˜2) = −p˜21 − p˜22 + h′1p˜1 + h′2p˜2 ≥ −
1
2
(p˜1 + p˜2 − 2C)(p˜1 + p˜2) > 0 ,
as in the constant case, one obtains an estimate of exponential type of the decay of |p˜|.
CASE 3: p˜(so) /∈ V and p˜(so) not in a neighbourhood of the origin. In this case, combining (4.19)
and the continuous dependence of solutions with the estimates of the constant case (indeed, using
(4.11), they remain true), we can prove that |p˜| → ∞ for finite s and that the rate of blow-up of
|p˜| can be estimated in the same way we did in the case of h′i ≡ κi.
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In any case either u˜ ≡ u or, in the original coordinates x, u˜ fails to satisfy (2.15).
It remains to prove what happens if u˜ is an admissible solution with discontinuous (rescaled)
gradient p˜(s). Then assume p˜ has an admissible jump at so. Using (4.19) it holds, for p˜1 > 0,
d
ds
(p˜1 + p˜2)
∣∣∣∣
p˜1+p˜2=0
= −2p˜21 + (h′1 − h′2)p˜1 < −2p˜21 + (κ1 − κ2 + 2δ)p˜1
and hence, provided δ small enough, the region Ξ1 (resp. Ξ2) defined in the First Step is positively
(resp. negatively) invariant also in this setting. Then conclusions made in the constant case still
hold and u˜ corresponding to p˜ is not admissible, since it violates (2.15).
5 - Players with conflicting interests
We consider here a game for two players, with dynamics (4.1) and cost functionals as in (4.2).
Contrary to the previous section, we now assume that the player have conflicting interest. Namely,
their running costs hi satisfy
h′1(x) ≤ 0 ≤ h′2(x). (5.1)
We begin with an example showing that in this case the H-J system can have infinitely many ad-
missible solutions. Each of these determines a different Nash equilibrium solution to the differential
game.
Example 2. Consider the game (4.1)-(4.2), with
h1(x) = −κx , h2(x) = κx , (5.2)
for some constant κ > 0 (see Figure 5).
In this special case, the equations (4.8) reduce to
{
p′1 = −2κp1 − κp2 − p21 ,
p′2 = κp1 + 2κp2 − p22 .
(5.3)
The point P
.
= (−κ, κ) is stationary for the flow of (5.3). Settinq q1 .= p1 + κ, q2 .= p2 − κ, the
local behavior of the system near P is described by
{
q′1 = −κq2 − q21 ,
q′2 = κq1 − q22 .
(5.4)
Notice that
dp2
dp1
=
dq2
dq1
= 0 if q1 =
q22
κ
,
dp1
dp2
=
dq1
dq2
= 0 if q2 = −q
2
1
κ
,
dp1
dp2
=
dq1
dq2
= 1 if p1 = −p2 .
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By symmetry across the line p1 + p2 = 0, any trajectory passing through a point Pα
.
= (−α,α)
with 0 < α < κ is a closed orbit. We thus have infinitely many solutions of the H-J equations
(5.3), having bounded, periodic gradients. Therefore, all of these solutions are globally Lipschitz
continuous and satisfy the growth condition (2.15). Notice that the homoclinic orbit ph(·) starting
and ending at the origin also yields a periodic solution to the original equation (4.6). Indeed, to a
solution p = p(s) of (5.3) with
lim
s→−∞
p(s) = lim
s→+∞
p(s) = 0 ,
through the reparametrization x = x(s) there corresponds a solution p = p(x) defined on some
bounded interval ]ℓo, ℓ1[ . This yields a periodic solution p = p(x) with period ℓ = ℓ1 − ℓo.
The main result of this section is concerned with the existence and uniqueness of admissible
solutions.
Theorem 4. Let any two constants κ1, κ2 be given, with
κ1 < 0 < κ2 , κ1 + κ2 6= 0 . (5.5)
Then there exists δ > 0 such that the following holds. If h1, h2 are smooth functions whose
derivatives satisfy ∣∣h′1(x)− κ1∣∣ ≤ δ , ∣∣h′2(x)− κ2∣∣ ≤ δ , (5.6)
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for all x ∈ IR, then the system of H-J equations (4.3) has a unique admissible solution.
Proof. We will first consider the linear case, where h′i ≡ κi is constant. Then we recover the more
general case by a perturbation argument.
Existence. Assume that hi(x) = κi x with κ1 + κ2 > 0, which is not rectrictive. The existence of
an admissible solution for (4.8) is trivial, since we have the constant solution p ≡ (κ1, κ2), which
corresponds to (
u1(x), u2(x)
)
= (κ1x+ κ1κ2 +
κ21
2
, κ2x+ κ1κ2 +
κ22
2
) . (5.7)
Consider now the case of h′1, h
′
2 small perturbations of the constants κ1, κ2. Notice that, in the
previous case, every ball B(κ,R) around κ = (κ1, κ2) with radius R <
√
2
2 (κ1 + κ2) was positively
invariant for the flow of (4.8).
Indeed, setting qi = pi − κi, the system becomes{
q′1 = −(κ1 + κ2)q1 + κ1q2 − q21 ,
q′2 = κ2q1 − (κ1 + κ2)q2 − q22 .
(5.8)
and it holds
d
ds
|q|2
2
= −q31 − q32 − (κ1 + κ2)(q21 + q22 − q1q2) = −(q21 + q22 − q1q2)(κ1 + κ2 + q1 + q2) .
Now, since |q| ≤ R <
√
2
2 (κ1 + κ2) ensures κ1 + κ2 + q1 + q2 > 0, one can conclude that
d
ds
|q|2
2
= −(q21 + q22 − q1q2)(κ1 + κ2 + q1 + q2) ≤ −
|q|2
2
(κ1 + κ2 + q1 + q2) < 0 , (5.9)
and this prove the positively invariance of such a ball B.
Then, provided δ is small enough, we can choose one of these balls as a neighborhood U of
(κ1, κ2) positively invariant also for the perturbed system (i.e. h
′
i 6≡ κi). Once we found such a
compact, positively invariant set U , we can repeat the existence proof of Theorem 2:
a. Consider p(ν): [−ν,∞[→ IR2 solution of the Cauchy problem with initial datum p(ν)(−ν) =
(κ1, κ2);
b. By positive invariance, p(ν)(x) ∈ U for x > −ν. We then extend the function p(ν) to the whole
real line by setting p(ν)(x) ≡ (κ1, κ2) for x < −ν;
c. By uniform boundedness and equicontinuity, the sequence p(ν) admits a subsequence converg-
ing to a uniformly continuous function p : IR 7→ U . Clearly, this limit function p(·) provides a
global, bounded solution to the system (4.8). In turn, this yields an admissible solution u(·)
to (4.6).
Uniqueness. First Step. Let h′i ≡ κi and κ1 + κ2 > 0. In order to prove that the previously
found solution is the only one that satisfies (A1)-(A3), we assume that u˜ is another solution of the
system (4.3), whose gradient will be denoted by p˜. Figure 6 depicts possible trajectories s 7→ p˜(s)
of the planar system (4.8). We remark that:
1. The regions {(p1, p2) 6= (0, 0) : p1 ≥ 0 , p2 ≤ 0 , p1 + p2 ≤ 0} and {(p1, p2) 6= (0, 0) : p1 ≥
0 , p2 ≤ 0 , p1 + p2 ≥ 0} are positively and negatively invariant for the flow of (4.8), respectively.
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2. If p˜(so) ∈ {(p1, p2) 6= (0, 0) : p1 ≥ 0 , p2 ≤ 0 , p1 + p2 ≤ 0} for some so, then |p˜| → +∞ as
s→ +∞. Indeed, since
d
ds
(p˜1 + p˜2) = −p˜21 − p˜22 + κ1p˜1 + κ2p˜2 < −(p˜1 + p˜2)2 < 0 ,
we can assume there exist s¯ ≥ so and ε > 0 such that p˜1(s¯)+ p˜2(s¯) < −ε. Moreover, for any σ > s¯
we have
d
ds
(p˜1 + p˜2)(σ) ≤ −(p˜1(σ) + p˜2(σ))2 < −(p˜1(s¯) + p˜2(s¯))(p˜1(σ) + p˜2(σ)) < ε(p˜1(σ) + p˜2(σ)) .
After an integration, we find (p˜1+ p˜2)(s) ≤ −ηeεs for s > s¯ (and η > 0) and hence (p˜1+ p˜2)→ −∞
as s→ +∞.
3. If p˜(so) ∈ {(p1, p2) 6= (0, 0) : p1 ≥ 0 , p2 ≤ 0 , p1 + p2 ≥ 0} for some so, then |p˜| → +∞
as s → −∞. Indeed, reasoning as above, we can assume there exist s¯ ≤ so and ε > 0 such that
p˜1(s¯) + p˜2(s¯) > ε and the following holds for any σ < s¯:
d
ds
(p˜1 + p˜2)(σ) ≤ −(p˜1(σ) + p˜2(σ))2 < −(p˜1(s¯) + p˜2(s¯))(p˜1(σ) + p˜2(σ)) < −ε(p˜1(σ) + p˜2(σ)) .
This implies (p˜1 + p˜2)(s) ≥ ηe−εs for s < s¯ (and η > 0), hence (p˜1 + p˜2)→ +∞ as s→ −∞.
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4. If p˜(so) ∈ {(p1, p2) : p1 > 0 , p2 > 0} for some so, then |p˜| → +∞ as s → −∞. Indeed, let
ε > 0 such that p˜1(so) > ε. Since
d
ds
p˜1 = −p˜21 + (κ1 − κ2)p˜1 + κ1p˜2 < −p˜21 < 0 ,
it is sufficient to observe that for σ < so
d
ds
p˜1(σ) ≤ −p˜1(so)p˜1(σ) < −εp˜1(σ) .
Hence, integrating, p˜1(s) ≥ ηe−εs for s < so (and η > 0) and either p˜1 → +∞ as s→ −∞ or there
exists s¯ < so such that p˜ is in the previous case.
5. If p˜(so) ∈ {(p1, p2) : p1 < 0 , p2 < 0} for some so, then |p˜| → +∞ as s → +∞. Here we can
repeat the argument of 4. with p˜2 in place of p˜1.
6. Let p˜(so) ∈ {(p1, p2) 6= (0, 0) : p1 ≤ 0 , p2 ≥ 0} for some so and set pˆ as the unique solution in
this region that tends to the origin as s → +∞. Notice that, as s → −∞, either pˆ(s) crosses the
p2-axis or pˆ2 → +∞. Then:
• if p˜ = pˆ, then as stated above either there exists s¯ < so such that p˜(s¯) is in the case 4, or
p˜2 →∞ as s→ −∞. In both cases |p˜| → ∞ as s→ −∞.
• if p˜(so) belongs to the region between pˆ and the p2-axis, then there could be only three
possibilities: either p˜ is the unique solution that tends to the origin as s → −∞, or p˜2 → ∞
as s→ −∞ without p˜ crosses p2-axis (and, of course, this can only happen if pˆ does not cross
it too), or there exists s¯ < so such that p˜(s¯) is in the case 4. above. In the former case we
will estimate the decay of |p˜| in 8; in the latter ones |p˜| → ∞ as s→ −∞.
• if p˜(so) doesn’t belong to the region between pˆ and the p2-axis, then either p˜2 →∞ as s→ −∞
or there exists s¯ < so such that p˜(s¯) is in case 5 above (and this is possible only if also pˆ(s)
crosses the p2-axis). In both situations, again, |p˜| → ∞ as s→ −∞.
7. We can now provide more accurate estimates on the blow-up rate. Indeed by previous analysis,
as in Theorem 3, a blow-up of |p˜| can only occur when either p˜i → −∞ as s→ +∞ or p˜i → +∞
as s → −∞ (for some index i). Hence, exactly as before, we can prove that there exists so ∈ IR
(and η > 0) such that |p˜(s)| ≥ η|s−so| . In terms of the original variable x, such a trajectory yields
a solution defined on the whole real line, because by (4.7)∣∣∣∣dxds
∣∣∣∣ = ∆(p˜(s)) ≥ co(so − s)2 . (5.10)
for some co > 0 and therefore either x(s) → +∞ as s → so− or x(s) → −∞ as s → so+. In
conclusion, the solution u˜(x) which corresponds to p˜(x) violates the growth condition (2.15), and
hence it is not admissible.
8. Notice that only in case 6-(ii), where p˜ is the unique solution that tends to 0 as s → −∞, we
have a solution that could remain bounded in the whole IR. But in this case, we shall have as
s→ −∞
|p˜|(s) ≤ (p˜2 − p˜1)(s) ≤ γecos , (5.11)
for some γ, co > 0. Indeed studying the linearized system near the origin we see that p˜ tends to
(0, 0) along the direction (1,
κ2−κ1+
√
κ2
1
+κ2
2
−κ1κ2
κ1
). Then there exists s¯ such that for s < s¯ the
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following holds:
p˜2(s) > (1 +
√
2
2
)
κ2 − κ1
κ1
p˜1(s) = β
κ2 − κ1 +
√
κ21 + κ
2
2 − κ1κ2
κ1
p˜1(s) , (5.12)
where
β =
(1 +
√
2
2
)(κ2 − κ1)
κ2 − κ1 +
√
κ21 + κ
2
2 − κ1κ2
, β ∈ (0, 1) . (5.13)
Notice that, setting
α =
κ1 − 2κ2 − (κ2 − 2κ1) β κ2−κ1+
√
κ2
1
+κ2
2
−κ1κ2
κ1
1− β κ2−κ1+
√
κ2
1
+κ2
2
−κ1κ2
κ1
=
=
κ1 − 2κ2 − (κ2 − 2κ1)(1 +
√
2
2
)κ2−κ1
κ1
1− (1 +
√
2
2 )
κ2−κ1
κ1
> 0 ,
(5.14)
we obtain exactly
β
κ2 − κ1 +
√
κ21 + κ
2
2 − κ1κ2
κ1
=
κ1 − 2κ2 − α
κ2 − 2κ1 − α . (5.15)
Hence, for s < s¯,
p˜2(s) >
κ1 − 2κ2 − α
κ2 − 2κ1 − α p˜1(s) , (5.16)
i.e. (κ2 − 2κ1)p˜2 − (κ1 − 2κ2)p˜1 > α(p˜2 − p˜1). Recalling that |p˜| → 0 as s → −∞, which implies
the existence of co > 0 and sˆ such that α− p˜1(s)− p˜2(s) > co for any s < sˆ, we find
d
ds
(p˜2 − p˜1) = p˜21 − p˜22 + (κ2 − 2κ1)p˜2 − (κ1 − 2κ2)p˜1 > (α− p˜1 − p˜2)(p˜2 − p˜1) > co(p˜2 − p˜1) ,
for s small enough (namely s < min{s¯, sˆ}). Integrating we find (p˜2 − p˜1)(s) ≤ γecos (γ > 0) and
hence (5.11) is proved. Next, recalling (4.7), in terms of the variable x we obtain
∣∣∣∣dxds
∣∣∣∣ = ∆(p˜(s)) = O(1) · e2cos , (5.17)
lim
s→−∞x(s) = xo <∞ ,
for some xo ∈ IR. Therefore, to the entire trajectory s 7→ p˜(s), there corresponds only a portion
of the trajectory x 7→ p˜(x), namely the values for x > xo. To extend this trajectory also on the
half line ]−∞, xo], we need to construct another trajectory s 7→ p(s) with lims→+∞ p(s) = 0. But
any such trajectory, by previous analysis, will yield a solution u˜(x), which violates the sublinear
growth condition (2.15) as x→ −∞ and is not admissible.
Second Step. Next, we prove uniqueness of the admissible solution the case where h′i is not constant.
Let u(·) be the solution constructed before, with p = u′ remaining in a small disc V , centered at
(κ1, κ2) with radius ρ > 0, positively invariant for the flow of (4.8). Moreover, let u˜ be any other
smooth solution of (4.3). We split the proof in three cases.
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CASE 1: p˜(s) ∈ V for every s. In this case, as in Theorem 3, we look at the difference w(s) =
p˜(s)− p(s) and at the linear evolution equation for w:
dw
ds
= A(s)w(s) , (5.18)
where A is the averaged matrix
A(s) =
∫ 1
0
Df(θp(s) + (1− θ)p˜(s))dθ , (5.19)
and f is the vector field describing our system, as in (4.12). Since p, p˜ ∈ V , the matrix A(s) is very
close to the Jacobian matrix Df(κ1, κ2), therefore
d
ds
∣∣w(s)∣∣ ≤ −K ∣∣w(s)∣∣ , (5.20)
for some constant K > 0. Indeed,
Df(κ1, κ2)x · x < −κ1 + κ2
2
|x|2. (5.21)
Provided that δ, ρ > 0 are small enough, there will exist K > 0 such that A(s)x · x < −K|x|2. But
then, exactly as in Theorem 3, (5.20) implies p(0) = p˜(0) and hence p = p˜ by the uniqueness of
the Cauchy problem.
CASE 2: p˜(so) /∈ V for some so and, in particular, p˜(so) in a small neighborhoodW of the origin.
Consider the linearized system(
p′1
p′2
)
= H ·
(
p1
p2
)
, H =
(
h′1 − h′2 h′1
h′2 h
′
2 − h′1
)
,
and notice that the origin is again a saddle point for this system. Indeed H has eigenvalues λ1, λ2
such that, recalling (5.6) and provided δ < 1
2
min{−κ1, κ2},
0 <
√
2
2
(κ2 − κ1 − 2δ) ≤ |λi| =
√
(h′1)2 + (h
′
2)
2 − h′1h′2 ≤ κ2 − κ1 + 2δ . (5.22)
Moreover its eigenvectors v1, v2 form angles α1, α2 with the positive direction of the p1-axis such
that
0 ≥ tanα1 = λ1 + (h
′
2 − h′1)
h′1
> tanα2 =
λ2 + (h
′
2 − h′1)
h′1
.
More precisely, for δ small enough, we have
0 ≥ tanα1 > (1−
√
2
2
)
κ2 − κ1 + 2δ
κ1 + δ
> (1 +
√
2
2
)
κ2 − κ1 − 2δ
κ1 − δ > tanα2 . (5.23)
Hence, as in the previous proof of Theorem 3, we show the existence of four sectors Si, i = 1, . . . , 4
(see Figure 7), where the following holds:
(a) If p˜(so) is in S1 or S3, then |p˜(s)| grows for s < so and the solution moves away from W ;
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1S
W
2p
4S
3S
2S
2v
1v
1p
Figure 7
(b) Both boundaries of S2 and S4 allow orbits to only exit from those sectors for s < so;
(c) If p˜(so) /∈ Si for all i = 1, . . . , 4, then for s < so the angle between the vector (p˜1, p˜2) and the
p1-axis is strictly monotone, forcing the solution either to reach S1 or S3, or to move away from
W ;
(d) Finally, if p˜(so) is in S2 or S4, then for s < so the solution can tend to the origin. But
d
ds
(p˜2 − p˜1) = p˜21 − p˜22 + (h′2 − 2h′1)p˜2 − (h′1 − 2h′2)p˜1 >
> p˜21 − p˜22 + (κ2 − 2κ1 − 3δ)p˜2 − (κ1 − 2κ2 − 3δ)p˜1 ,
and, provided δ is small enough, we can use (5.23) to find α > 0 such that
d
ds
(p˜2 − p˜1) > p˜21 − p˜22 + (κ2 − 2κ1 − 3δ)p˜2 − (κ1 − 2κ2 − 3δ)p˜1 > (α− p˜1 − p˜2)(p˜2 − p˜1) . (5.24)
Hence an estimate of exponential type of the decay of |p˜| follows as in (5.11).
CASE 3: p˜(so) /∈ V and p˜(so) not in a neighbourhood of the origin. In this case, combining (5.6)
and the continuous dependence of solutions with the estimates of the constant case (indeed they
are true also in this more general setting), we can prove that |p˜| → ∞ for finite s and that the rate
of blow-up of |p˜| can be estimated in the same way we did in the First Step.
In any case either u˜ ≡ u or, in the original coordinates x, u˜ fails to satisfy (2.15).
Finally, we rule out the possibility that the gradient p˜ = u˜′ has jumps. Looking at the phase
portrait in Figure 6, we see that after a one or at most two admissible jump, the values of p˜ must
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fall within the positively invariant region {(p1, p2) : p2 < 0 , p1 + p2 < 0}. It follows that p˜
cannot have any more jumps, and the estimates in 2, 5 and 7 (together with their analogs in the
non-constant case) imply that u˜(x) violates (2.15) as x→ +∞. Therefore, u˜ is not an admissible
solution.
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